

# Reactive Hazards in Shell's Hydrofermylation Process Reactive Hazards in Refineries: Hydrocracker Runaways

**Nick Gonzales** 



### **Cautionary note**

The companies in which Shell plc directly and indirectly owns investments are separate legal entities. In this content "Shell", "Shell Group" and "Group" are sometimes used for convenience to reference Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general. Likewise, the words "we", "us" and "our" are also used to refer to Shell plc and its subsidiaries in general or to those who work for them. These terms are also used where no useful purpose is served by identifying the particular entity or entities. "Subsidiaries" and "Shell subsidiaries" and "Shell companies" as used in this content refer to entities over which Shell plc either directly or indirectly has control. The terms "joint venture", "joint arrangements", and "associates" may also be used to refer to a commercial arrangement in which Shell has a direct or indirect ownership interest with one or more parties. The term "Shell interest" is used for convenience to indicate the direct and/or indirect ownership interest held by Shell in an entity or unincorporated joint arrangement, after exclusion of all third-party interest.

### Forward-Looking statements

This content contains forward-looking statements (within the meaning of the U.S. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995) concerning the financial condition, results of operations and businesses of Shell. All statements of the thorn statements are statements of future expectations that are based on management's current expectations and assumptions and involve known and unknown risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results, performance or events to differ materially from those expressed or implied in these statements. Forward-looking statements include, among other things, statements concerning the potential exposure of Shell to market risks and statements expressing management's expectations, beliefs, estimates, forecasts, projections and assumptions. These forward-looking statements are identified by their use of terms and phrases such as "aim"; "ambition"; "inaticipate"; "aspiration", "inspiration", "inspiration, "inspirati

### Shell's net carbon intensity

Also, in this content we may refer to Shell's "net carbon intensity" (NCI), which includes Shell's carbon emissions from the production of our energy products, our suppliers' carbon emissions in supplying energy for that production and our customers' carbon emissions associated with their use of the energy products we sell. Shell's NCI also includes the emissions associated with the production and use of energy products produced by others which Shell purchases for resale. Shell only controls its own emissions. The use of the terms Shell's "net carbon intensity" or NCI is for convenience only and not intended to suggest these emissions are those of Shell plc or its subsidiaries.

### Shell's net-zero emissions target

Shell's operating plan and outlook are forecasted for a three-year period and ten-year period, respectively, and are updated every year. They reflect the current economic environment and what we can reasonably expect to see over the next three and ten years. Accordingly, the outlook reflects our Scope 1, Scope 2 and NCI targets over the next ten years. However, Shell's operating plan and outlook cannot reflect our 2050 net-zero emissions target, as this target is outside our planning period. Such future operating plans and outlooks could include changes to our portfolio, efficiency improvements and the use of carbon capture and storage and carbon credits. In the future, as society moves towards net-zero emissions, we expect Shell's operating plans and outlooks to reflect this movement. However, if society is not net zero in 2050, as of today, there would be significant risk that Shell may not meet this target.

### Forward-Looking non-GAAP measures

This content may contain certain forward-looking non-GAAP measures such as adjusted earnings and divestments. We are unable to provide a reconciliation of these forward-looking non-GAAP measures to the most comparable GAAP financial measures is dependent on future events some of which are outside the control of Shell, such as oil and gas prices, interest rates and exchange rates. Moreover, estimating such GAAP measures with the required precision necessary to provide a meaningful reconciliation is extremely difficult and could not be accomplished without unreasonable effort. Non-GAAP measures in respect of future periods which cannot be reconciled to the most comparable GAAP financial measure are calculated in a manner which is consistent with the accounting policies applied in Shell plc's consolidated financial statements.

The contents of websites referred to in this content do not form part of this content.

We may have used certain terms, such as resources, in this content that the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) strictly prohibits us from including in our filings with the SEC. Investors are urged to consider closely the disclosure in our Form 20-F and any amendment thereto. File No 1-32575, available on the SEC website www.sec.gov

### **Nick Gonzales**

Ph.D. in Chemistry (U of Utah)

Postdoctoral researcher in ChemE (UC Berkeley)


28 years with Shell

Leads a team of five reactive hazards specialists


Principal Technical Expert Reactive Hazards



### How a Hydrocracker fits in a Refinery



1997 Tosco Avon Hydrocracker Incident – Overview



### 1997 Tosco Avon Hydrocracker Incident – Overview

- > Process upset led to increasing the reactor temperature.
- > Process upset resolved but the reactor temperature not returned to normal.
- > The increased reactor temperature eventually led to a runaway exotherm.
- > Operations thought they could "save" the situation and did not activate safeguards.
- > Time from high temp alarm to Loss of Containment (LOC) was 7 minutes.
- > The LOC was followed by an explosion and a fire.
- There were 46 injuries and 1 fatality.

Link to Investigation Report:

https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=234304


### **Example Hydrocracker Operating Conditions & Chemistry**

Operating conditions: 650°F at 1900 psig (340°C at 130 barg)

ightharpoonup Reaction:  $C_{28}H_{58} + H_2 \rightarrow C_{18}H_{38} + C_{10}H_{22} + 50 \text{ kJ/mol } H_2$ 

> We want hydrocarbons to be "snipped" only once in a hydrocracker.

## **Example Hydrocracker Process Layout**



### **Example Hydrocracker Operation**


> Trickle Flow Reactor (i.e., it rains hydrocarbons in a hurricane of hydrogen)

Feed

Conditions: 650°F at 1900 psig (340°C at 130 barg)

➤ <u>Need all 4</u> of the following for hydrocracking:

- > Hydrocarbon
- > Hydrogen
- > Catalyst
- > High temperatures
- ightharpoonup Reaction heat ightharpoonup temperature rise across each catalyst bed
- > Temperature rise controlled via injection of cold hydrogen quench



# How Hydrocracking Develops into a Global (full diameter) Runaway

### How a Hydrocracker Temperature Runaway Develops

If temperature control is not sharp (e.g., temp overshoot allowed) or temp control is lost, desired reactions become undesired & dangerous

- ➤ Thus, SMALL increases in reactor temperature STRONGLY advised (~1.0°F)
- How to lose temperature control:
  - > Feed too hot
  - > Loss of quench cooling
  - > Catalyst too active
    - > Fresh catalyst
    - > Tosco scenario


← Poor operation

Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.

December 2025

11

What a Hydrocracker Temperature Runaway Looks Like



Distance from top of Bed #1


- > A small increase in feed temperature is magnified as it passes through each catalyst bed
  - > As Temp 1, reaction rate 1 because all reactants are available
  - > Reactor temperature builds after each bed, so the outlet temperature climbs quickly

Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.

December 2025

12

### Time Available to Respond During a Hydrocracker Runaway



Tosco incident: 7 minutes from start of temperature excursion to LOC

13


# How Hydrocracking Develops into a Hot Spot Runaway

### Hydrocracker Temperature Runaway Due to Hot Spots

Hot spot led to LOC of the Exxon Baytown hydrotreater (2012)



## 2012 Exxon Baytown Hydrotreater Incident



## Consequences of a Hydrocracking Runaway

### Hydrocracker Runaway: Overtemperature or Overpressure?

> Temperature: Reactor temperature can exceed design temperature

```
\triangleright oil + H<sub>2</sub> \rightarrow diesel + jet + heat
```

> Pressure Possibilities:

```
    > oil + H<sub>2</sub> → diesel + jet + heat (reaction consumes moles of gas)
    > oil + H<sub>2</sub> → hydrocarbon + methane + heat (moles of gas unchanged)
    > PV = nRT (when temperature ↑, pressure ↑)
```


- > Reality: Reactor pressure does not increase substantially
  - > No relief valves have lifted during previous temperature runaways.

This is an over temperature scenario.

No protection from the relief device!

### Consequence of a Hydrocracker Temperature Runaway

### Tensile Strength Estimations for 11/4Cr-1/2Mo



### Consequence of a Hydrocracker Temperature Runaway

- > Equipment wall thickness
  - > Reactor: 10 12 inches (25 30 cm)
  - > Outlet piping: 1 inch (2 3 cm)
- Location of high temperatures
  - > Global Temperature Runaway: The outlet pipe is the mostly likely point of failure
  - > Hot Spot Temperature Runaway: The reactor wall is the most likely point of failure

### Consequence of a Hydrocracker Temperature Runaway after LOC




Figure from
"Fundamentals of Fire and Explosion"
By Daniel Stull

21


> Tosco maximum recorded temperature was 1950°F (1060°C)

Hydrocarbons 800C <u>above</u> AIT will ignite upon contact with air → instant jet fire!

# Safeguarding Hydrocracking Runaways

### Hydrocracker Safeguards for Temperature Runaway


Example radial thermocouple arrays to monitor catalyst bed temperatures



### Hydrocracker Safeguards for Temperature Runaway

Recycle hydrogen flow too low or thermocouples detect high temp:

- ▶ Depressure reactor system on low recycle hydrogen flow ← Runaway imminent
  - > Loss of hydrogen recycle cannot be mitigated by increasing fresh H<sub>2</sub> flow
- ▶ Depressure reactor system on high reactor temperature ← Runaway underway
  - > Depressuring will outpace reduction in tensile strength as the wall temperature increases
  - > Depressuring removes hydrogen (the limiting reactant)



### **Hydrocracker Runaways: Final Thoughts**

> Small changes in operating conditions can lead to a runaway

$$> 8-10^{\circ} F (4-5^{\circ} C)$$

- > Not an overpressure scenario. Thus, a relief device is not an effective mitigation.
- > The runaway can happen in minutes. Do we have time for an operator response?
- > Final temperatures can be very large
  - > Up to 2000°F (1000°C)
- > Effective safeguarding against runaways is critical
  - > Contact the experts when modifying the process and/or safeguards (thermocouple design, alarm settings, trip points)

